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The PHOENIX project aims to examine the impact of structural changes to the health and care 
system in England on the functioning of the public health system, and on the approaches taken to 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? This report presents the findings of our phase one case study 
research and first national surveys of Directors of Public Health (DsPH) and Councillors who lead on 
public health issues.  
 
As part of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (Secretary of State 2012) significant changes to the 
public health system were introduced. Such changes included: the creation of a new national public 
health service, Public Health England (PHE); a restored emphasis on the role of general practice in 
health improvement (DH 2010); the transfer of public health responsibilities from Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) to local authorities; and the creation of Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) as 
committees of each unitary and upper-tier local authority, where key leaders from the health and 
care system work together to improve the health and wellbeing of their local population and reduce 
health inequalities. 
 
As a result of the new arrangements, responsibility for commissioning and delivering public health  
activities are now split between a number of organisations, including: local authorities, general 
practice, PHE, NHS England (NHSE) (formally called the NHS Commissioning Board), and voluntary 
organisations. This potentially means a more complex commissioning and service delivery 
environment for public health than previously (DH 2011a, DH 2011b). 
 
The shifting of many public health responsibilities back to local authorities was a generally popular 
aspect of the reforms, with the belief that local authorities have a strong population focus, the 
ability to shape services to meet local needs, the ability to influence the wider determinants of 
health and the ability to tackle health inequalities - all of which are much wider than health service 
provision.   
 
There were many concerns around the practical implementation processes and wider ramifications 
of shifting public health duties and personnel to local authorities. Some stakeholders were 
concerned that the public health function might become weakened or fragmented  W that some local 
authorities might be slow to realise the full extent of their public health responsibilities across health 
improvement, health protection and health services; that the advice and influence of public health 
over local National Health Service (NHS) bodies might wane; and that the public health workforce 
might lose their independence and ability to challenge powerful interests within local government.  
There were concerns too about the public health workforce and the impact of all the flux in the 
system created by the reform process (Gadsby et al 2014; Coleman et al 2013).  Many commentators 
noted that whilst the changes were welcome, the timing was difficult, with the financial context for 
local government presenting huge challenges (LGIU 2012).   
 
The changes brought about by the reforms are profound, with not only many potential 
opportunities, but also many risks.  The Department of Health (DH) had restrained from being overly 
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prescriptive in its approach to how public health should be organised and should function within 
local authorities.  Consequently, the functioning of the public health system taking shape since April 
2013 is an important focus for research. Our initial scoping review and associated analysis of the 
Select Committee report into the role of local authorities in health issues (Riches et al 2015), 
identified a number of key areas that provided a framework for the current phase of this research.  
These related to the governance and accountability mechanisms for public health, local decision 
making processes, different ways of working and the need to develop new relationships to work in a 
more fragmented public health system (Gadsby et al 2014). In  order to explore these questions our  
research objectives were: 
 
1. To conduct a critical analysis of the impact of recent structural reforms on the public health 
system and its likely ability to improve population health and tackle obesity (as an example of a 
complex problem). 
2. To develop a clearer understanding of the relationships between different components within 
the public health system at national and local level. 
3. To identify the ways in which organisations within the public health system approach the 
establishment and/or commissioning of health improvement interventions (by focusing on their 
approaches to tackling obesity). 
4. To examine commissioning decision-making processes within case study sites, with regards to 
obesity/weight management activities, to identify influences on decision-making and relational 
influences on health improvement. 
5. To identify difficulties and opportunities facing actors within the new public health system in 
progressing the public health agenda, and specifically in relation to preventing/managing 
obesity.  
 
This second interim report summarises the preliminary findings of the case study research which 
commenced in March 2014 (but which continues throughout 2015) and national surveys of both 







The study incorporates multiple methods, including key informant interviews, document analysis, 
local case-studies and national surveys.  We conducted an initial scoping review in the first nine 
months (from April 2013) which we used to frame the focus of our data collection in subsequent 
case study research (Gadsby et al 2014). We began the case study phase of the research in March 
2014, following the recruitment of case study sites. We are also conducting two annual national 
surveys of Directors of Public Health and Councillors with a responsibility for public health in the 152 
English unitary and upper-tier authorities: the first survey was undertaken through July/August 2014 
and the second is due in September 2015. The focus was on exploring the impacts of structural 
changes at national, regional and local levels on the planning, organisation, commissioning and 
delivery of health improvement services. The aim was to examine these broader relationships in 
order to capture different organisational arrangements in local government and the NHS.  
 
In addition to examining the wider structures and organisation of public health at a local level, we 
are examining the process of commissioning and delivery using obesity as a tracer topic.  In the 
second phased of case study work (commencing in March 2015), we are particularly interested in 
examinŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ŽĨ ůŽĐĂů ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ƚŽ ŽďĞƐŝƚǇ ? ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? (Rittel and Webber 1973, Hunter 2013): the approaches taken by key actors; how 
commissioning decisions are made; what the resulting spectrum of services/activities looks like; and 
whether there is any change in the balance of services commissioned or carried out, ranging from 
individual-level clinical services (such as surgery) to high-level upstream population approaches. 
 
In order to explore these issues in detail we identified a range of key criteria for selecting case study 
sites (whether upper or lower tier, unitary or county and district, size, etc.) that would enable us to 
investigate relational aspects within local authorities and between local authorities and other public 
health agencies and stakeholders (e.g. Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), PHE, NHSE).  
Recruitment of case studies commenced in December 2013 with the aim of obtaining a mix of 
authorities, geographical spread, varied socio-demographic and socio-economic contexts and 
different political control. We collated key organisational and demographic data for all 152 upper-
tier and unitary authorities in England, and from that database we purposively selected 11 councils 
and wrote to the relevant chief executives/leaders and DsPH. Five of our targeted authorities 
declined to participate, and one did not respond.   
 
In five sites, we were able to begin discussions and data collection in March.  While the 
recruitment/access issues were being dealt with, it became clear in the authorities that we were 
working in that the public health organisational landscape was evolving quickly and becoming even 
more complex.  We quickly identified a range of complex joint arrangements for public health. In 
county case studies, the important role of district councils was immediately obvious. We felt it was 
imperative that the research captured this aspect of the new system and explored the 
district/county council relationships.  In other case study sites there were a range of organisational 
arrangements between authorities including joint appointment of DPHs, shared public health teams, 
formal inter-authority collaborations and agency arrangements where one local authority acted on 
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behalf of another. These are not all discrete developments with some case study sites displaying a 
number of different relationships. In addition to these inter-authority relationships, each case study 
has a range of differing relationships with CCGs, service providers and regional and national public 
health and NHS agencies.   
 
This complexity is important in terms of exploring relational and organisational issues and how local 
authorities develop their commissioning and delivery systems for public health. As a result, it was 
decided to focus our research on five case studies and develop a more in-depth exploration of these 
areas to include relevant adjacent authorities and the broader context within which public health 
was developing in these areas. This has resulted in the inclusion of a sample of district councils 
within county council areas, adjacent unitary/county authorities where there are shared services or 
formal/informal relationships, extended data collection to the supra-network and the inclusion of 
adjacent authorities sharing a DPH. Within our five case study areas, we have included nine upper-
tier or unitary authorities, and a sample of four lower-tier councils.  In each case study area, the 
focus has remained on the initial council, but with additional interviews in the other authorities to 
explore the organisational relationships and collaborative approaches being developed.  This 
approach has enabled a much richer analysis of current developments related to organisation of 
public health and a clearer picture of the emerging public health system structures to be identified. 
The change in case study sites is shown in table 1.   
 
Table 1: Proposed and final case study sites 
Site Proposed case study sites selection 
criteria 
Final case studies 
A County Council  County council including sample of 2 
different sized district councils and adjacent 
unitary authority 
B Urban unitary authority with shared 
DPH 
Cluster of three urban unitary authorities 
with shared DPH 
C 
 
Urban metropolitan unitary 
authority  
Urban metropolitan unitary authority  
D County Council  County Council including sample of two 
different sized district councils and two  
unitary councils 
E Urban metropolitan unitary 
authority  
Urban metropolitan unitary authority 




2.1 Case study descriptions: 
Site A: 
This site encompasses a large two-tier council, with multiple districts and CCGs. The upper-tier 
council is Conservative-run, covering a heterogeneous population that as a whole is within the least 
deprived third of authorities (in England), but which contains pockets of severe deprivation.  The 
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county council is run by a leader and a cĂďŝŶĞƚ ? ǁŚŽ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘eǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚŽ
appoint a corporate management team representing the main directorates.  The HWB is chaired by a 
ĐĂďŝŶĞƚŵĞŵďĞƌĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚƌĞĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚǇ ?ƐĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ ?
 
The public health team transitioned into the Council in 2011, although the DPH had been a joint 
appointment for several years before that. The team are located in one place in the council, as a 
separate department. However, in recent re-organisations, that department has now been situated 
within a new social care, health and wellbeing directorate.  The public health team are organised by 
function, but have a nominated consultant lead for each CCG - each CCG area also has a local HWB, a 
specialist lead for each district council, and leads for each county council directorate. Due to the 
importance of local links and geography, data collection has been expanded to encompass a 
neighbouring unitary authority, and a sample of two district councils. 
 
Site B: 
This site focuses on an urban borough council with a Conservative majority. The borough has a 
relatively young, relatively healthy population (compared with England as a whole), but areas of 
great affluence sit alongside pockets of deprivation.  Due to financial pressures, the council has 
combined specific areas of service delivery with neighbouring councils. Public health is one of those 
combined services, being hosted by one borough, but working across the other boroughs. The 
council is run by a cabinet, supported by a chief executive and other strategic directors who together 
form the Strategic Executive Board.  The public health team is located in one place, and are 
structured according to function. They have one strategic DPH and three Deputy DsPH. The team 
ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ ƉůĂĐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚŝĞĨ ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ďĞĞŶ ŵŽǀĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ
Adult Social Care Services directorate.  There is a separate HWB in each of the boroughs. Due to the 
nature of the sharing arrangement, whilst our focus is on the one borough chosen, we are expanding 
our data collection, to some extent, to include the other boroughs. 
 
Site C: 
Site C is in the north of England and is ranked very highly in terms of overall deprivation. It is 
particularly disadvantaged in relation to employment, income, education, skills and training. The 
council is Labour-led and has two parliamentary constituencies. The DPH reports to the chief 
executive in the council and the public health team are in a community orientated directorate, 
encompassing adult social care, education, children and families, among other responsibilities.  The 
site was linked to one CCG that has now merged with a neighbouring, larger CCG. The HWB is 
chaired by a councillor and was previously chaired by the council leader. 
 
Site D: 
Site D is a two-tier county council. There are a number of district councils in the lower tier. This is a 
Conservative-led council with a leader and cabinet, and five departments overseen by a chief 
executive. The HWB is chaired by the lead member for health and two district councillors sit on the 
HWB to represent all district council interests. Income levels are generally above the national 
average, but there are pockets of deprivation within the county.  
Each of the districts has their own non-statutory HWB partnership groups.  The county council works 
closely with the neighbouring city council, and with a small neighbouring unitary authority, where 
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the county public health department acts as an agent for the council.   These three local authorities 
have a joint health overview and scrutiny committee to scrutinise the work of the health services 
that work across the three authorities.  Data collection has been extended to take account of these 
important links. There are two CCGs, one of which crosses the county border with the neighbouring 
small local authority mentioned above. 
 
Site E: 
Site E is a unitary authority in a large city with high levels of deprivation which are almost universally 
above the national average across the city. The authority is Labour-led with no major opposition.  
The council operates a committee structure, with the Executive as the principal decision making 
body.  The leader of the Executive is also the chair of the HWB.  This is supported by senior officers, 
one of whom is the DPH.  
 
There is on-going restructuring within the council and there will be a directorate of people, bringing 
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ĂĚƵůƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞrvices, and a directorate of place to deal with planning and 
regeneration.  Public health works across these areas and is not a clearly defined separate team. 
There is a small core public health team that works with the DPH. There are multiple CCGs and the 
city is served by a number of hospital trusts. There is a successful collaborative network that works 
across the local authorities in the region, on behalf of the DsPH. Data collection has been extended 
to examine the role of this group.  
 
2.2 Data collection to date: 
To date, we have conducted 51 interviews in our case study sites. In addition we also observed 11 
meetings across the five sites and collated a wealth of supplementary documentary data which 
contributed to how we developed the themes for analysis.  The interviews and observations focused 
mainly on the broader organisational and relational issues. The first survey consisted of a web-based 
questionnaire sent to all DsPH (and, where groups of local authorities shared a DPH, to the senior 
public health consultant in each council) and to councillors who had a public health brief (normally 
the cabinet member or executive lead). We achieved a good response for the DPH survey with 97 
responses (93 usable replies, response rate 61%); and for the councillor survey, we received 56 
responses (52 usable, response rate 35%).  Given the descriptive nature of the research, the 
ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚĨŽƌĂ ‘ƵƐĂďůĞ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐƐĞƚůŽǁ ?ĂŶĚĂůůƌĞƉůŝ ƐǁĞƌĞŬĞƉƚŝĨƚŚĞǇƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
we did not already know. One DPH (responsible for three authorities) opted out of our survey, and 
three cabinet leads had already opted out of doing any surveys utilising the Survey Monkey 
platform.  Overall we received at least one response from 115 local authorities (76%), and have both 
DPH and elected member perspectives in 34 (22%) authorities.  There was a reasonably 
representative spread of DsPH responses across England in terms of region, type of authority, party 
in power, population size and public health budget per head.  The same was true for elected 
members, apart from there being more replies than expected from London boroughs and less from 
non-metropolitan unitary authorities. Fuller details of the survey and descriptive statistics are 






2.3 Data analysis  
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Data has been coded and analysed (using NVIVO 10) 
for key themes. The focus and themes for analysis were drawn from the data and discussed within 
the research team. For this report we are presenting data on the organisational arrangement for 
public health within local authorities and relationships within the local public health system. Data 
from the surveys has been incorporated where relevant. Data from observations of meetings and 
documents has been used to both contextualise our data collection. Within this report we have used 
generic titles for interviewees and only made specific reference to case study sites or titles when 
needed for clarification.  This has been done to ensure, as far as possible, that we maintain the 






3.1 Organisational Arrangements for Public Health 
 
The government gave little prescription about how the delivery of public health should be organised 
within local authorities, although statutory responsibility and employment of DsPH lie with upper-
tier county councils and unitary authorities. In Healthy Lives, Healthy People (DH 2010) the 
government recognised that in fulfilling their public health function, councils could work together, 
sharing the role of DPH (DH 2010: para 4.9) and leaving local authorities  “ ? ĨƌĞĞ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ũŽŝŶƚ
approaches to public health where they think that is the best way to tackle health improvement 
challenges that extend beyond local areas. ? ?, ? ? ? ? PƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?tĞŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇcouncils 
are sharing public health staff and responsibilities. Of the 93 DsPH responding to our national survey, 
nearly a third (N=31) led public health teams providing services for between two and eleven 
authorities. When asked about the nature of the sharing arrangements not all replied, but those that 
did showed an even spread across different models, with  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐcovering a mixture of 
core and local team responsibilities, including co-commissioning or using one of the public health 
teams for a specific service (See figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Nature of local authority sharing arrangements 
 
 
The degree and complexity of sharing was evident in our case studies. In some cases this was formal, 
with contracted shared services or agreements supported by memoranda of understanding, while in 
others, respondents referred to informal arrangements  W for example, attending CCG meetings 
where the CCG covered more than one council. In one of our case studies (Site E) public health 
arrangements mirrored other inter-council organisational structures which had been previously 
developed and in another (Site C), some services (such as Tier 3 weight management services) were 
jointly commissioned across six unitary authorities.  Over half (48/90) of our DPH survey respondents 
reported some form of inter-authority sharing arrangements between public health teams. Strategic 





0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Shared Director of Public Health (DPH)
ǁŝƚŚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƚĞĂŵƐŝŶĞĂĐŚůŽĐĂů ?
^ŚĂƌĞĚ ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?ƚĞĂŵŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
distinct teams in each local authority 
Single shared team working across all
participating local authorities
Other (please explain):
What is the nature of the sharing arrangement? 
(% of N=28 DsPH) 
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were also examples of where some authorities supported the work of smaller authorities with 
responsibility for public health.  
 
3.2 Arrangement (and size) of the public health team 
In its public health white paper, the government stressed the importance of local democracy and 
autonomy within the new public health system, and ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “There are various models for 
how effective public health services can be delivered, and it should be determined locally as to how 
particular areas make their arrĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?, ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?   
Our survey showed that for most public health teams, there was a substantial transfer of staff from 
the NHS to local government. In some areas though, there were already joint appointments or other 
cross-working arrangements for certain public health staff members. Also, in the lead-up to and 
during transition, some public health staff left or were transferred to other bodies.  One public 
health team member explained the process prior to transfer in their site: 
 
 “ĞĂĐŚĞŵƉůoyee of the PCT was asked to complete a form looking at their portfolio and what 
their responsibilities were and if... and there was like a 50% threshold or cut-off whether you 
would remain... whether you would go to the CSU - which is the Commissioning Support Unit 
supporting the CCGs - or, you know, whether you go to local authority or to some other part 
of the system, like NHS England or Public Health England, depending on the portfolio that 
ǇŽƵǁĞƌĞŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ?(Public health commissioning manager).  
 
Respondents to our DPH survey reported that in most cases teams remained the same or were made 
smaller (See figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Changes to public health team size and composition 
 
 
However, other councils reported a growth in staff  W particularly for other, non-specialist public 
health roles.  In one of our case study sites, ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ  ‘ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ƉŽƐƚ
created,  “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞŚĂĚƋƵŝƚĞĂĐůĞĂƌ ƌĞŵŝƚ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŚŝĞĨǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ? ? ? ƚŽŐŽĂŶĚĞŶƚŚƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ
17% 





















In the transfer from NHS to local authority did the public health 







ůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŽƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ? (public health consultant). This and one other or our sites had also 
recruited more staff to bolster their business / strategic planning and commissioning support roles. 
 
As in our scoping review we found that there was a degree of organisational turbulence within 
public health teams due to both a continuing re-organisation of public teams but also broader local 
authority wide restructuring. Following the complex transfer of staff, the majority of our sites have 
also seen subsequent changes to structures within the local authority which were continuing. 
Respondents in our case study sites discussed at length the problems associated with transferring 
staff and bedding down public health within new organisational arrangements. This was especially 
complex where multiple teams were merging to provide a service across larger geographical areas 
(e.g. across a whole county, or across multiple councils).  However, for many respondents 
organisational restructuring remained a continuing issue.   
 
Local authorities are generally composed of directorates (and/or departments/divisions). How these 
are organised, and where public health sits in these arrangements, can make a difference to how 
things operate and for the (perceived) status of public health and the DPH within and outside a local 
authority. Our survey data identified a variety of internal organisational arrangements for public 
health teams, as shown in figure 3.  The most common arrangement for public health (51%) was to 
remain together as a team but be placed within another directorate.  
 













0% 20% 40% 60%
Our team is not based here - it is hosted by another local
authority
Our team is a distinct public health directorate in this
local authority
Our team is a section of another directorate (please
specify)
Our team is distributed across directorates or functions,
or across multiple authorities (eg virtual, hub, etc)
We have a merged model in which public health and
another local authority directorate are combined
Other (please give details below)
How is your public health team arranged in this local authority?  
(% of N=90 DsPH) 
13 
 
3.3 Position of public health staff within the council 
Prior to the establishment of the new system, concerns were expressed about the position of the 
DPH and their relationship with the council. Many commentators felt that the DPH should be 
sufficiently senior that they would have the autonomy to hold other areas of the local authority to 
account if necessary (HCLGC 2012; Riches et al, 2015).   
In our case study sites, reporting lines from public health (via the DPH) to the chief executive were 
seen as important. This reflected (perceived) standing/importance given to public health and was 
thought to affect the perceptions of others (within and from outside the local authority) about how 
important the role of the DPH and public health more widely was.  It was also felt to be important 
what local authority fora/groups the DPH was invited to (management and strategic), in terms of 
voice and visibility throughout the local authority. 
 
 “/ƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŽƚŚĞŚŝĞĨǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ/ĂƚƚĞŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƚĞĂŵǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŶŝƐƐƵĞ ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚ
ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĂďůĞ Ăƚ ĞǀĞƌǇ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ  ? ďƵƚ / ?ŵ ŐƌĂƚĞĨƵů ĨŽƌ ƚŚĂƚ ? ? (Director of public 
health). 
 
 “The Public Health Director is trying to make sure that that is encouraged by being on the 
ƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵĂŶĚĂůůƚŚĂƚƐƚƵĨĨ ?ŝƚƐƚĂƌƚƐƚŽŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĂŶĚŝŶĨŝůƚƌĂƚĞ ? ?>ĞĂĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
council). 
 
In one of our sites a cross-council public health board meeting had been established to ƚƌǇ “to give 
some focus across all of [the council] to pick up the public health agenda ?(Councillor). As shown in 
figure 4 the survey showed that DsPH, and to a lesser extent elected members holding the health 
portfolio, sit on a number of cross-departmental groups within their authority. 
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Responses to the DPH survey demonstrate that public health teams are located across a wide range 
of local authority directorates including as a stand-alone department or within adult and children 
services/social care; neighbourhood and community services; people and communities, adults, 
ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĂŶĚŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĐŚŝĞĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?Ɛ
department. At the time of our survey, 28% of DPH respondents were in a directorate of public 
health and 42% were managerially responsible to the chief executive  W similar figures to those found 
by the Association of Directors of Public Health (ADPH 2014).   
 
This diversity of organisation was reflected in our case study sites. In two sites (A and B), the public 
health function transferred into its own directorate, with direct line to the chief executive/head of 
paid service, to then be subsequently moved into a directorate responsible for social care. This 
raised some concerns for the public health consultants involved, particularly around the 
budget/function being subsumed or lost within a much larger (more expensive) directorate, and 
around the difference in population perspectives:  
 
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƌŝƐŬƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ůůďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞƐŝůŽ ?ĚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůĐĂƌĞ ? ?(Public health consultant).  
 
 “ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƐŵĂůů ĨƌǇ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ďƵĚŐĞƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐĂƌĞ ŚĂƐ
and therefore my concern is that does mean that the prominence of the work that we do is 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽƚĂƐŐƌĞĂƚ ?(Public health consultant,).  
  
 “ƚŚĞǇƐĂŝĚ ‘line management by social care ? and I said  ‘why? ?  ? ? ? social care deals with less 
ƚŚĂŶ ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůŚŽŵĞ ? ?(Public health consultant).  
 
In one site (E) public health was transferred into a more diverse directorate, following a whole-
council restructuring, and in another site (D) it was in a directorate of its own.  
 
 “tĞ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞŽƵƌŽǁŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞĂŶĚǁĞ ?ƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĂvery small directorate compared 
ƚŽ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐ ĂĚƵůƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ  ? ? ?^Ž / ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ?ƌĞ
ĐůĂƐƐĞĚĂƐ ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞŽƵŶƚǇĐŽƵŶĐŝů ŝƐĂǀĞƌǇƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŵŽǀĞ ?(Senior public 
health manager). 
 
On-going change has been evident in most of the sites (in terms of directorate form and function), 
especially as the local authorities receive yet more budget cuts. The process of developing and 
integrating new functions at the same time as dealing with pressures and cuts within local 
authorities has been a clear challenge. There is every indication that this is likely to continue in the 
future: 
 
 “One of the big pushes nationally, within local government, is to be slimmer - less money, less 
staff, obviously, and have less directorĂƚĞƐ ?(Director of public health). 
 
This, in some cases, has proved confusing to those working as part of public health, and was causing 
some uncertainty and extra disruption - as illustrated by the following respondent: 
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 “/ŵĞĂŶ ?ŵǇũŽďƚŝƚůĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŶŽǁ ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŝƐǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŽǁŽƌŬ
each day, and somebody asks you to do something, you do it basically. And you find a way of 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƌŽƵŶĚŝƚ  ? ? ?ƚŚĞŶǇŽƵĨŝŶĚĂŶ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞǁĂǇŽĨĚŽŝŶŐ ŝƚ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƐŽ
despite your joďƚŝƚůĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞǁŚŽǇŽƵĂƌĞƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŽ ?(Local authority manager). 
 
Amongst our interviewees, there were seen to be advantages and disadvantages to either having the 
public health team spread through the local authority, or kept as a close team: 
 
 “ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽŶĐĞ ǇŽƵ ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŶĚ ƉƵƚ ƚŚĞŵ ? ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ƚŚĞŵ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ĂŶ
organisation, there is no critical mass and I think then, the impacts public health can have 
woƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ?(Public health consultant). 
 
 “^Ž/ ?ǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚpublic health so that we can stay as a specialist team, we link strongly into 
ŽƚŚĞƌďŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐŽŵĞŽĨŽƵƌĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞďĞƐƚƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶŽƚŚĞƌďŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƚŚĞŶǁĞ ?ǀĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌďŝƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐŽĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐŽŵĞŽf the 
performance monitoring we need around public health, contract monitoring for our 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ? ?ƐŽƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŝƚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚƚĞĂŵ ?^ŽŝŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ
ŝƚ ?ƐĂŚƵďĂŶĚƐƉŽŬĞ ?(Director of public health).  
 
Public health did not always sit well within defined directorates with more specific responsibilities. In 
particular, councils tend to organise member involvement through committee or cabinet member 
areas of responsibility. It was recognised that public health did not always fit to committee 
structures and that other committees beyond the HWB are relevant for much public health work. 
One respondent described the importance of a specific associated cabinet role which includes health 
and public health so that it is seen clearly on ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?Ɛ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ŚĞůƉŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ
political support:  
 
 “/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞƐƵƌĞǁĞŚĂĚĂůĞĂĚcabinet member for health, as we called it. So, public 
health, and what else we expected to come along, was not just going to be lost in that social 
ĐĂƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ / ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ  ? ? ? ďƵƚ / ďĞůŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĂ  ƚŚĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŶĚ
health, from social care, in terms of a successful transition and giving the right prominence to 
ƚŚĞƌŽůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇǁĂƐƌĞĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ ?s what we did. And I got political 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĂƚ ?(Chief executive). 
 
3.4 Position of public health staff within the local system 
Public health was seen as a function that crossed many organisational boundaries.  The public health 
teams in our case study sites were developing relationships across multiple organisations within 
their local systems.  Each public health team has a duty to provide support and advice to the CCGs in 
their area, and this was done by having nominated public health consultants linked to each CCG.  Key 
ƉĞŽƉůĞǁĞƌĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ  Wfor example, the DPH being on the CCG 
board. In one of our sites, the public health representatives on the three CCGs attended weekly 
management meetings. There was seen to be joint working on a number of initiatives, and aligned 
and sometimes joint commissioning.  Whilst relationships with CCGs in all our sites were reported as 
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being productive, they had been challenged throughout the transition process (particularly with 
regards to sorting out budgets (see section 3.5 on resources).  They also have been, and continue to 
be challenged by the capacity (in terms of staff time) of the public health team  W particularly where 
the number of consultants is few compared with the number of CCGs. Nearly three quarters (73%) of 
the DsPH replying to the survey worked with one CCG, 18% worked with two or three CCGs, and the 
remainder worked with between four and seven CCGs. While our survey suggested that DsPH were 
positive about the help the public health team provided for CCGs, especially help with strategic 
planning/assessing needs (100%), reviewing service provision (88%) and deciding priorities (85%), 
our case study respondents referred to the problem of high expectations of CCGs 
 “we have a memorandum of understanding that was drawn up [with the CCGs] before we 
ŵŽǀĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŝƚǁĂƐƚǁĞĂŬĞĚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĂƚ ?ŝƚ
would take your whole... all your work ? (Public health consultant). 
 
When asked about capacity to provide various services to CCGs, between 28-32% of DsPH said the 
public health team always had sufficient capacity, and very few said they did not at all (0-2.5%).  
Although the majority of replies (41- ? ?A? ? ǁĞƌĞ Ă ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁere sizeable 
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞǇĚŝĚ ?ŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇ ?ŚĂǀĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ as shown in figure 
5.  
Figure 5: Capacity of the public health team 
  
However, there was variation in capacity between authorities with only 13% of DsPH in London 
boroughs of the opinion that their public health ƚĞĂŵ  ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐ ? ŚĂĚ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ
constructive relationships, allocate appropriately trained staff and provide actionable 
recommendations to CCGs (significantly different at 95% confidence level).  In contrast, 57% of DsPH 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇ'Ɛ ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ  ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐ ? ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞĂƐ  ?ŶŽƚƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ
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In two-tier councils, another important relationship is between the public health team and the 
district councils. Whilst the role of district councils in the public health function are well recognised, 
there was little thought given prior to the reforms as to how and to what extent public health staff 
would relate to district councils.  Whilst public health interviewees reported having worked with 
district councils in the past, it was clear that in the new system, this relationship had been 
strengthened.  As illustrated by this public health consultant:  
 
 “ ?ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĞĂĚ ? ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ůĞĂĚƐ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ
person from each district who is responsible for sort of health and wellbeing. And they come 
together, and they meet with people from public health, and I'm now the sort of lead for 
that.  To talk about how we can work better together.  And we've come up with a system 
which is now much more inclusive, and open, in terms of how they can influence the whole of 
ŽƵƌ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ŶĚ / ƚŚŝŶŬ ƐŝŶĐĞ ǁĞ ?ǀĞ ĚŽŶĞ ƚŚĂƚ ? Ănd had that open 
ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂƌĞŵƵĐŚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ?/ǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇ ? ? 
 
As illustrated above, in case study sites A and D, each county arranged its public health team to 
interact closely with district councils, with named public health specialists for each district, although 
in the larger county (site A) it was clear that resources were stretched thinly across more than ten 
districts.  One leader of a district council in site A felt that the link between the council and the 
public health team was now much stronger following the reforms: 
 
 ?tĞůůǁĞ ?ƌĞŵŽƌĞƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ? ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞŵŽƌĞƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂ
ƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐŝƚƚŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƵƐǁŚŽ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚ
ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ? ‘ǁĞůůǁĞĐĂŶĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?tĞĐĂn allocate some sums here.  Do you want to be part of 
ŝƚ ? ? ?(Leader, district council). 
In both our county sites, due to the large number of district councils, not all could be represented on 
the county-level HWB.  However, both had representative district councils on the board, and in both 
counties there were local versions of HWBs  W in site A, these were designed to match CCG 
boundaries, so all the district councils sit on at least one of those local HWBs, and in site D, there 
was one local board for each district council.  All the local HWBs had a dedicated public health 
specialist as member.  In addition, in site A, each local HWB had an integrated commissioning board, 
which is attended by a member of the public health team (e.g. business manager or commissioning 
manager).  This is to ensure commissioning is aligned and integrated where possible at a local level.  
HWBs were seen as important for public health despite their broader function and current strong 
focus on integrated care.  The DPH is a statutory member of the HWB but there were different 
expectations about how engaged HWBs actually were, or should be, with the wider public health 
agenda: 
 
 “tĞŚĂǀĞĂǀĞƌǇƐƚƌŽŶŐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞƚƚĞƌĂƌĞ&ƵŶĚ W ĂůůƚŚĂƚƐŝĚĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?/ ?ŵ
conscious somĞƚŝŵĞƐŽĨĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?tĞůů/ŵĞĂŶǁŚĞŶ/ƐĂǇĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŝƚ ?Ɛ
ƉƌŽďĂďůǇĂďŝƚƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƐĂǇ ? ‘Are you actually thinking enough 




Concern had been expressed that  ,tƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ŵŽƌĞ  “ƚĂůŬŝŶŐ ƐŚŽƉƐ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ
statutory powers (HCLGC 2012, Humphries and Gelea 2013). However, respondents in our case 
studies were generally positive about their role and who was involved, despite some feelings that 




The 2013 reforms established a new national protected public health budget, drawn from NHS 
allocations, and split between PHE and local authorities. Furthermore, the money allocated to local 
authorities was in the form of ring-ĨĞŶĐĞĚďƵĚŐĞƚƐ  ?ĨƌŽŵ  ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ?ƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ
spend during the transition and early years. The ring-fencing of budgets was, and remains, 
contentious, with public health and government personnel generally supporting them, and local 
authorities generally resisting them (Riches et al, 2015).  Whilst the intention was to prevent the 
public health grant being absorbed into other areas of the local authority at the expense of public 
health, there were in fact few conditions as to how the grant was spent (DH 2013). Consequently, 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ŽĨ ĂŶĚ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĂŝĚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ďƵĚŐĞƚƐ ƚŽ ĨƵŶĚ
services and activities that were not previously considered funded out of the publiĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ  ‘ƉŽƚ ?
(Iacobucci 2014).  At the same time though, there is a view that public health now has the 
opportunity to fund and invest in other departments that have an impact on the wider determinants 
of health. This came out strongly in our case study sites.  Also, within our DPH survey, almost 90% of 
respondents (compared to 65% of elected members leading on health), suggested some of the 
public health budget has been invested in other local authority departments.  However, in 19% of 
local authorities additional funds had been allocated to public health budgets. Although the budget 
has been used more broadly, the perception of DsPH is that key decisions about spend appear to 
remain mainly with them, with some involvement from other directorates (see figure 6).  The view 
of elected members was that authorising this expenditure was undertaken more widely across the 
authority. 
 





















Who authorises expenditure from the ring-fenced public 








Some DsPH and public health consultants in our case study sites felt they had more freedom and 
autonomy before moving to the local authority, although the amount of spend was seen to dictate 
public health freedom.  Some sites outlined that there are budget restriction thresholds and lower 
sign-off limits following the move to the local authority which has impeded autonomy, especially as 
so many decisions go through cabinet (public health can sign off small amounts of spend with larger 
budget decisions going to cabinet).  Some respondents referred to the importance of public health 
specialists ? clinical roles as providing a degree of autonomy around decisions related to clinical issues 
as other local authority staff were not able to become involved in these types of decisions. 
Our case study findings and the responses to the surveys also clearly show that in some areas 
additional funding has been provided to support public health activities.  Findings so far suggest 
that, in some areas at least, public health professionals are beginning to influence resources and 
spending across the council as a whole, in addition to being largely in control of their own ring-
fenced budget (see section 4.2 on influence across the council).  
Across the local public health system as a whole, the splitting of NHS resources for public health 
during the transition phase was clearly difficult, posing particular problems in some areas. In one of 
our case study areas in particular, the initial allocation and distribution of funds has caused 
significant confusion and in some cases conflict and disagreement.  Respondents in a number of sites 
mentioned problems encountered with funds being allocated to public health when it should have 
been allocated to CCG and vice versa. There is a continuing debate to clarify who pays for what and 
who has responsibility for what.  Interviewees in all our case study sites referred to instances where 
relationships with other parties (e.g. CCGs, NHS England, PHE) were made difficult by the 
complexities and lack of clarity surrounding the splitting of funding pots. 
3.6 Resource issues in two tier Council areas 
In Site A, where there was a two tier structure, respondents mentioned the context of council 
budget cuts and how this has had an impact on the funding of the work that is going on in the 
district council areas. In one of our county sites some funding for public health activity was allocated 
to districts but there has been a pulling back to the centre as the county council strove for greater 
cost-effectiveness.   
While there were many signs in our two-tier sites of positive co-operation and cordial relationships 
(see section 4.4 on public health and district councils), there were also signs of inherent tensions 
around the way that the public health budget is spent and allocated.  When the county council is 
increasingly commissioning services on a county-wide basis, it becomes difficult to then break down 
the spending by district.  One district council leader felt that this leads to confusion: 
"they [the public health consultants] put forward an item agenda, we agree an agenda item, 
but we've got no idea of what resources that goes behind it and whether or not we'll be 
treated as fairly in our [local] HWB area as the others are. So basically there's no way of 
telling at present, well from where I sit anyway ... whether the needs of our community are 
greater than somewhere in [the west of the county] or so-on, so you get behind the public 
health data, but you don't get the commensurate funding understanding that sits behind it to 
deal with the issues" (Leader, district council). 
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From a county-level perspective, this DPH talks about how widely the public health budget is spread: 
 “/ ĚŽ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ Ɛŝƚ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ƚĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ ƉĞŽƉůĞƚĂůŬ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ ĚŽŝŶŐ ?  /
ŬŶŽǁ/ ?ǀĞƐĂƚĂƌŽƵŶĚŽŶĞďĞĨŽƌĞŶŽǁĂŶĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ, you know, what, I fund all of that and I 
fund all of that.  Oh, I fund half of that and I fund all of that.  So, you know, I think it adds 
value to bring all the partners together at a local area, but having said that if you look at 
where the pooled resource comes from and the core sense of would this happen without the 
input from the county council and public health, the answer is possibly not.  District 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ďƵƚ ĂƐ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ŝƚ ĂĚĚƐ ǀĂůƵĞ / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
mind ?(Director of public health). 
It should also be remembered that aside from council tax, councils can raise money from charges for 
services. So within counties, districts may have different revenue streams. This can lead to significant 
local variation  W for instance, in one district popular with tourists, town centre parking provides a 
lucrative source of income. Other poorer districts do not have such sources of extra revenue and in 
turn have less funding to commission local services. 
3.7 Organisational arrangements for public health  ? key points 
We found a wide variety of sharing arrangements for public health, such as sharing services, sharing 
the expertise of public health team and joint DsPH between local authorities. These arrangements 
were both formal and informal. Following the transfer from PCTs, most of the public health teams 
had remained the same size or made smaller, however we saw some evidence of increased size 
among less traditional roles within the teams. Public health teams were located across a wide range 
of local authority directorates and there were some concerns that where the public health budget 
falls in social care, it may be lost or subsumed due to the directorate structure and the large size of 
the social care budget. While nationally our survey found that only just over a quarter of DsPH were 
in public health directorates most respondents in our case study sites stressed the importance of 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇĂŶĚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽƚŚŝŶŬĂďŽƵƚƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ “ŝŶ
all they dŽ ? ?
 
Councillors interviewed in our case study sites believed public health was building good relations 
within local authorities and the public health role was valued by the council. This was echoed by 
DsPH in our national survey, with 79% saying they had  ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ?ďƵŝůƚŐŽŽĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůŽĐĂů
authority. A key role of public health teams is their work with elected members  W a relationship 
emphasized by respondents in our case studies. The role of the public health professional is as an 
adviser to elected members and implementing decisions made. Our survey of DsPH showed that 
ŵŽƐƚĨĞůƚ ‘ƋƵŝƚĞŽĨƚĞŶĂďůĞ ?ƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? ?A? - 
see also page 25 figure 8), felt more able to influence the work of the local authority as a whole than 
prior to 2013. The case study and survey data show public health staff stretched across a large 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌŽůĞƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞůǇ ?ĂŶĚĂƚĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐůĞǀĞůŝŶĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ? 
 
In our survey most DsPH reported that the ring-fenced public health budget had been used to invest 
in other local authority departments, whereas only 65% of elected members thought this was the 
case. This was reflected in our case studies although this was not always discussed as a negative 
21 
 
point with references made to investing in other areas of public health activity across local 
authorities. More DsPH (58%) felt they were solely responsible for decisions on the allocation of the 
public health budget compared to elected members with this view (40%). In some authorities 
additional resources have been allocated to public health but there was limited evidence that public 







4. Relationships and functions within the local public health system 
 
4.1 Roles and responsibilities in public health 
In our case studies we asked interviewees about their roles and responsibilities in relation to public 
health within the new system (i.e. post-reforms).  They talked about these roles in relation to other 
actors within the system, and with reference to their roles and responsibilities pre-reforms.  Within 
the interviews, discussions about roles also emerged when talking about accountability, decision 
making and leadership. It was clear that the reforms brought about a great many changes in the 
roles of pre-existing actors (e.g. local authorities, elected members, public health professionals), as 
well as the creation of roles for newly formed actors (e.g. PHE, CCGs, HWBs, NHSE,CSUs). The 
fragmentation of the public health system  W in terms of the fracturing of functions and division of 
responsibilities  W meant that there was a considerable lack of role clarity. 
In transitioning to local authorities, former-NHS public health staff had to learn about the structure, 
functioning and cultural norms of a new organisation.  Sometimes, where a team was providing a 
shared service, this learning process was multiplied, with each different local authority having its 
own history, structure and ways of working.  This was felt to be a considerable challenge, even 
where there had previously been a history of joint working: 
 
 “I think our big gap was that we...  I think we did not understand what a big cultural change 
ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚto come across here a few times a week or for a day a 
week and work here and then go back into the NHS which we all knew, to come here and 
have to take on all the organisational culture and structures and systems, and I think that 
kind of hit us a little bit ?(Public health consultant). 
 
Public health staff in case study sites felt that local authority processes were complex and rigid 
compared to that of the NHS and had therefore encountered difficulties in adapting to them.   Many 
interviewees outlined the challenges presented by the additional barriers and layers structured into 
the local authority decision-making process.  As a result, there were frustrations from public health 
practitioners and CCG members across the sites that the decision making process was more 
protracted and slower than they had previously experienced in the NHS and as a consequence, the 
ability to make immediate decisions had been removed.  One commissioning lead for public health 
in particular bemoaned the diffuseness of the local authority system and the need to go back and 
forth between different individuals at different levels to get decisions made.   
 
A common theme is that there appears to be an informal check and review mechanism built into the 
decision making process, and a pre-emptive strategy ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŚĞĂĚ ? ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌǁŚĂƚ
leverage might be required to achieve the desired outcome.  A DPH  likened this to  ?an evolutionary 
process ? and there was a sense from respondents of wishing to get  ?all their ducks in a row ?, with 
some respondents suggesting they check out ideas with significant actors before producing 
documentation or reports.  This appeared to be being used as a pre-emptive measure of scrutiny to 
avoid failure of public health papers and to ensure that the process went smoothly.  For example, in 





 ?All the papers that go to the cabinet committee for public health also go through that 
channel first so they always look at the papers and give their views ?(Councillor). 
 
This process of getting decisions made and ideas ratified with both officers and councillors was 
obviously made more challenging when working across multiple authorities. In one site, the public 
health team have developed a new stand-alone role to manage what they feel is a complicated and 
messy process. 
The interview and survey data clearly show that public health staff are stretched across a large 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌŽůĞƐ PǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ  ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞůǇ ?ĂŶd at a strategic level in councils (and in 2-tier councils at 
district level too); linking with all other parts of the councils; leading the core offer to the CCGs; 
leading on joint strategic assessments and strategy development through the HWBs; managing 
teams of public health staff; designing and overseeing organisational structural change; reviewing 
and commissioning services, and so on.  Some key themes emerged from discussions of their roles in 
the interview data.   
 
4.2 Public health influence at a strategic level 
 
Public health professionals, and the DPH in particular, have a role in influencing the council at 
corporate and strategic level.  Several elected members said they wanted to see their public health 
team  “ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚĞŶƚĂĐůĞƐ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ 'Ɛ ? (Councillor), 
and  “ƚŽ ŐŽ ĂŶĚ ĞŶƚŚƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? (Councillor).  Interviewees also 
stressed, however, that public health staff have a key role as  “ŝĚĞĂƐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚ ǀŝƐŝŽŶĂƌǇ ƐŽƌƚ ŽĨ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?  ‘ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝŶŐ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ?^ĞŶŝŽƌpublic health manager). They can 
also do this by raising the profile of public health issues, knowledge and approaches  by providing 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚĂƚĂ ?ďǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚďǇƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐa  “ƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚĞƚŚŽƐ ? (Senior public 
health manager). Interestingly, two DsPH stressed that the production of their annual report was a 
mechanism by which they could retain their professional independence and identity, hence 
suggesting the importance of the report in maintaining their status.   
The DPH survey asked respondents about the ability of the public health team to influence decisions 
ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?DŽƐƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?A? ?ĨĞůƚ ‘ƋƵŝĞŽĨƚĞŶĂďůĞ ?ƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
authoritǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚĨĂŝƌůǇĞƋƵĂůůǇƐƉůŝƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐĂďůĞ ? ? ? ?A? ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚŽĨƚĞŶŽƌŶĞǀĞƌĂďůĞ
(19%) to influence priorities.   
It was recognised by some case study interviewees that the high-level strategic influencing role is 
not easy for incoming public health professionals to establish or manage.  Having good support from 
other directors was seen to be important in fulfilling this corporate role. Several DsPH said that they 
would ideally be reporting directly to the Chief Executive. As one Deputy DPH explains: 
 “dŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚ ůĞǀĞůƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?  ‘KŚ
well have you thought about the impact on the health and wellbeing of the population by 




However, in one council this was seen not to be a panacea: 
 
 “ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞůƵĐŬǇƚŚĂƚŽƵƌŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨWƵďůŝĐ,ĞĂůƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƚŽƚŚĞŚŝĞĨǆĞĐ ?ďƵƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬ
ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌďĂƐĞĚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŝƚŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŐŽƚƌĞĂůůǇŚŝŐŚ
ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƌĞŶ ?ƚƵƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĂƚĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ? :ŽŝŶƚcommissioning manager).  
 
A DPH in one of our case study sites felt they had lost power  W  “ǁĞ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇŝŶĂǀĞƌǇƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? - because their function has been pushed down the organisational hierarchy, and it was 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “they ĂƌĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƉƵƐŚŝŶŐƵƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚůĞǀĞůǁĞƵƐĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ ?.  The DPH 
felt that public health had been placed at the wrong level in the organisation locally and was 
therefore not part of decision making at the strategic level.   
Conversely, in one of our case study sites the DPH felt liked they had  “gained a bit of power ? 
because the local authority was receptive to public health ideas.  He described the local authority as 
being interested in public health and therefore positive towards public health and their aims.  He 
perceived the public health team to have an increased ability to influence decisions in the authority, 
but felt this power was constrained by budgets and resources. This view was mirrored in other sites. 
Key areas for strategic influence are through the development of the Joint Health and Wellbeing 
Strategy (JHWS) and through membership of the HWB. Interviews with councillors and our survey 
results suggest that councillors are also involved in setting strategic directions for public health. 
While the DPH and their team were much more likely to lead the production of the JHWS, cabinet 
leads were often actively involved (see figure 7).   
Figure 7: DPH and councillor involvement in producing the Joint Health and Wellbeing Strategy 
 
When the DPH was not actually the lead person, leadership came from a variety of other parts of the 
authority, such as corporate/strategic/planning/policy teams.    
Despite some tensions identified in the case study work, the DPH survey indicated that the 
overwhelming majority (82%) of respondents felt more able to influence the work of the local 



























For your area's latest Joint Health and Wellbeing Strategy, were 








the work of the local authority just over half (54%) said they also felt more able to deliver real 
improvements by re-prioritising what they do as a team.  There were indications that this enhanced 
ability to influence others extended beyond the local authority setting too: the survey found just 
under half (46%) felt more able to influence the work of others such as schools.  Interestingly, while 
public health professionals felt they had gained influence within the authority, elected members 
reported that they had gained influence with CCGs, but with both feeling more able to deliver health 
improvements in schools and workplaces (see figure 8). 
Figure 8: Influencing improvements in local health 
  
ƐW,ǁŚŽ ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐ ?ĨĞůƚĂďůĞƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƐĂǇ
that since the reforms they were more able to influence the work of the local authority, that they 
had influence over other departments ? expenditure, and that being on the HWB allowed them to 
influence decision-making in their own organisation.  There was also an association between 
influence in the authority and feeling able to deliver real health improvements in other areas like 
workplaces and schools.  
Both the case study data and survey data highlights a relationship between organisational 
arrangements and the degree of influence afforded to or felt by public health professionals.  In the 
ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ? ŝƚǁĂƐ ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐW,ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŵĂŶĂŐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŽƌĂ
director of health, they were more likely to report that they were not often or never able to 
influence priorities within the local authority (23% compared to the average of 15%).   
In addition, analysis of the survey data suggests that characteristics of the authority where DsPH 
were based such as the type of authority, the political party in power, the number of residents and 
the size of the public health budget, also had an effect on DPH views on their degree of influence, 
thus pointing to the importance of local context. The survey results illustrate that there were local 
factors in connection with feeling able to influence priorities within the local authority, and whether 
being on the HWB allowed DsPH to have influence more widely in the local economy.  DsPH who 
said they were always able to influence the priorities in their authority were less likely to be in areas 
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always able to influence the priorities in their authority if they had high per capita public health 
budgets (29% compared to the average of 15%).   
Overall, the survey indicated that public health is beginning to influence resource use across the 
local authority  W not just the ring-fenced public health budget.  A small proportion (10%) of 
respondents to the DPH survey felt they had quite a lŽƚ ŽĨ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽǀĞƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? ŽǀĞƌ ŚĂůĨ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ  ?  ?A? ƐĂŝĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ Ă ůŽƚ ? ? ? ^ŽŵĞ
authorities had provided additional funds to the public health ring fenced budget (19%)  W generally 
areas of council expenditure previously classed as public health but also included, for example, 
community safety, HealthWatch and advocacy and emergency planning where it was seen as part of 
the DPH role.  
4.3 Cross-system influence and co-ordination 
Another key role for public health professionals is around cross-system influence, intelligence and 
co-ordination. Public health: 
 
 “ƉůĂǇƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƌŽůĞĂƐ Ă ŬŝŶĚ ŽĨ ŐůƵĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ  ? ? ? ŵĂǇďĞ ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚůǇ ĂůŵŽƐƚ
because they have a little bit of a foot in both camps bƵƚŝƚ ?ƐĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?
ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĂƚďŝŐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐĂƌĞĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐĂƌĞ ?(Councillor).   
Having moved into the local authority, it was stressed by many respondents that public health staff 
should not forget to work with CCGs e.g. through the provision of a core public health advice/data 
service and linking into the agendas of other local organisations. In our case studies public health 
consultants demonstrated that their roles now focused on making connections  W across the council, 
ĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ ?ůŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĂŐĞŶĚĂƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽ-ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ?/ŶŽŶĞ
site, public health team members have scoped specific issues (e.g. dementia), to enable a focus on 
them within HWB meetings.  In another, public health team members seek to influence 
commissioning decisions in their CCGs and across the council, partly through providing public health 
intelligence ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ĂƐ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ  “ ?the system to deliver public healƚŚ ?
(Director of public health).  Our survey data suggests that this shift has been significant with the 
move to local authorities making a big difference to the extent to which DsPH feel able to have an 
impact (as seen in figure 8). 
 
In influencing the system, participants often talked about using specific relationships as levers; key 
relationships would be used to help to smooth the process, understand what is required to get 
papers through the local authority and also to get political priorities agreed.  The influence of 
existing relationships and connections was referred to, as was the influence of knowing 
 ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƚĂƉƉĞĚŝŶƚŽ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽŶĞƐĞŶŝŽƌpublic health manager stressed 
the importance of having continuity of people/legacy relationships (in the NHS) suggesting that it is 
beneficial to work with people that they have worked with in the past, even though they may be in 
different organisations. This continuity of relationships has been difficult in a system that has been 
thrown into such flux, with many people moving into different roles, organisations and geographical 
areas.  Building new relationships with councillors, politicians, health leads and the council leader 
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was also mentioned as being important in terms of influencing and getting decisions made, 
particularly in terms of providing support for DsPH in getting major decisions through.    
 
It is clear both from policy documents and from our research data, that HWBs have an important 
role to play in cross-system coordination.  When interviewees talked about HWBs, it was usually 
with a sense of optimism.  HWBs were seen to play a key part in (potentially) pushing ahead system 
change, particularly around the integration agenda.  Their position in the council, and their 
membership - often chaired by the leader of the council, was seen to give the HWB the opportunity 
to progress on the whole redesign of the system, taking the public with them as they do. For DsPH 
the main benefit of the HWB ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐ  ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ? ŝŶƐƚƌƵmental in identifying main health & 
wellbeing priorities (61%) although ĂƐ ŵĂŶǇ ĂƐ  ? ?A? ŽĨ ƐW, ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ,t ǁĂƐ  ‘ŶŽƚ ƌĞĂůůǇ ?
making difficult decisions. One senior manager described it as  “ƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞƚŽĐŽŵĞƚŽ ?, given its high 
profile and membership, however, in our survey only 55-66% of DsPH felt that membership of the 
HWB was enabling.  As figure 9 shows, the responses for elected members were fairly similar, but 
slightly more positive, with more saying that membership of the HWB allowed them to influence 
decision-making in the authority (73%) and to engage with the development of the Better Care Fund 
(73%). 
Figure 9: Role on Health and Wellbeing Board 
 
While DsPH and elected members were very similar in the way they ranked the benefits of being on 
the HWB, cabinet leads were hugely more positive about the powers of the HWB on every aspect we 
asked about (See table 2).  For example, elected members rated identifying the main health and 
ǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŵŽƐƚŚŝŐŚůǇ ? ? ?A?ƐĂŝĚ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚo 61% of DsPH), followed by 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?A?ƐĂŝĚ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ
to 40% of DsPH).  At the other end of the rankings, 35% of Cabinet leads compared to only 6% of 
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Table 2:   In your opinion is the Health and Wellbeing 





Instrumental in identifying the main health and 
wellbeing priorities? 
DPH 60.5 33.3 6.2 81 
Cabinet 
Member  86.0 14.0 0.0 43 
Strengthening relationships between 
commissioning organisations? 
DPH 39.5 51.9 8.6 81 
Cabinet 
Member  77.3 18.2 4.5 44 
Beginning to address the wider determinants of 
health? 
DPH 23.5 49.4 27.2 81 
Cabinet 
Member  59.1 36.4 4.5 44 
Influencing cross-sector decisions and services to 
have positive impacts on health and wellbeing 
DPH 14.8 64.2 21.0 81 
Cabinet 
Member  50.0 43.2 6.8 44 
Facilitating the greater use of collective budgets? 
DPH 12.3 55.6 32.1 81 
Cabinet 
Member  43.2 50.0 6.8 44 
Helping to foster a collective responsibility for the 
use of budgets? 
DPH 9.9 63.0 27.2 81 
Cabinet 
Member  40.9 45.5 13.6 44 
Successfully incorporating active citizen 
involvement? 
DPH 9.9 42.0 48.1 81 
Cabinet 
Member  15.9 68.2 15.9 44 
Making difficult decisions? 
DPH 6.2 30.9 63.0 81 
Cabinet 
Member  34.9 51.2 14.0 43 
Directly commissioning services? 
DPH 1.2 11.1 87.7 81 
Cabinet 
Member  16.3 37.2 46.5 43 
 
Interviewees in our case study sites highlighted the HWB role in forging new or better relationships 
between different actors within the system  W in particular between elected members and clinicians, 
which in turn offers opportunities for change and improvement:   
 “ ?ǁĞŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽne relationship we had to get right was between elected members 
and clinicians, because they were the only two new entrants into the health and wellbeing 
ďŽĂƌĚĂƐĨĂƌĂƐǁĞǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?ĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇĞůƐĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŚĞƌĞďĞĨŽƌĞ ?(Senior strategy 
manager). 
 
In addition, HWBs have a role in encouraging new ways of working for health improvement, perhaps 
by focusing on a particular health issue and tasking others across the system with looking at how 
ƚŚĞǇ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ŝŶ ĚĞĂůŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚ ? Žƌ ďǇ  ‘ƐŚĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƵƉ ? ĂŶĚ ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ŽŶ
system actors, or by system actors putting pressure on each other, asking what more they can do, or 
what they can do differently.  This role of applying pressure has a performance management/ 
scrutiny aspect to it, which one senior manager described as  “ŚŽůĚ ?ŝŶŐ ? ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ƚŽ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ? 
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The operation of HWBs in our case study sites clearly reflected their relatively embryonic state  W 
these complicated bodies were taking time to take shape.  Perceived concerns included a lack of 
statutory powers and the ability to balance different agendas. The work load  W and possibly type of 
work  W of the HWB was sometimes different to anticipated, and boards were sometimes meeting 
with increasing frequency, and creating numĞƌŽƵƐ  ‘ƐƵď-ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ƚŽ ĐŽƉĞ
with the work.  Another evolving aspect of HWBs is their roles in relation to decision making, where  
 
 “ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞǇ ?,tƐ ?ŚĂǀĞŶŽĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ
the board goes back to the organisations in which the members are part, so the board itself 
has no formal decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?(Public health manager). 
 
4.4 Public health and district councils in two-tier authorities 
 
A key issue within county areas has been the relationship between county and district councils. The 
government recognised within their public health white paper that district councils have important 
public health functions (DH 2010). Relationships between county councils and district councils are 
complex and not always easy. In one of our county sites, a district councillor commented that 
relationships across this county were surprisingly good: 
 “ ?dŚĞĐŽƵŶƚǇ ?ŝƐŽĚĚ ? ?ƵƚǁĞĂƌĞĂƚǁŽƚŝĞƌƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ǇĞƚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐĂŶĚĐŽƵŶƚǇ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ
speaking, actuallǇǁŽƌŬǁĞůůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?EŽǁƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ? /ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ?ŽĚĚ  ?ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚǇŚĂƐƚŚĞ
ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƵŶƵƐƵĂů ?(District councillor). 
This may be partly due to the district council network in the county, which coordinated work, 
communication and co-operation between the districts.  But it was also due to good working 
relationships between individuals: 
 “ ?ǇŽƵ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĂĚ ƐŽŵĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ
conversations about where districts are involved in informing the commissioning work of 
public health at a county level on some things, and come to a place where it works, or it will 
ǁŽƌŬ ? ?(hief executive, district council). 
Conversely in our other county site the relationships were not always good. Nevertheless, 
relationships on the ground, particularly between public health staff and district councils, were felt 
to be better than those at member/leader/chief executive level. In both counties, public health 
professionals recognised that  W whilst being situated at county-level  W they need to work with 
district councils, a point also recognised by respondents at district levels; 
 “ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĚĞůŝǀĞƌƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?
environmental health, leisuƌĞ ? ?ĂůůĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚĐŽƵŶĐŝůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?  (Chief executive, district 
council). 
  
Engagement in public health activities varied from district to district, and the split of functions and 
responsibilities across district and county councils presented both opportunities and challenges. 
There are a number of reasons expressed by interviewees about why county-level public health staff 
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are working hard to engage with district councils.  Of particular importance was that districts provide 
a wider workforce to tap into and,  if the public health professionals can link better with the public 
health-oriented work that is already going on within district councils, they can maximise 
opportunities and improve results.  District councils have a lot of assets which make them, in some 
cases, ideal providers of services.  In one of our county sites, as a result of historical differences 
between two halves of the county (where two former-PCTs did things quite differently), districts in 
one half continued to receive public health funding to carry out health promotion activities (e.g. in 
smoking cessation and healthy weight services), whilst in the other half of the county, that funding 
was used to commission a community health services provider.  In our other two-tier site, much of 
the commissioning related to obesity is delivered at the district level and is described as being 
 “ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ? P 
 
 “^ Ž ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ / ƐĞĞ ƵƐ ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƌĞĂůůǇ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĂƚ ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ŝƚ Ăůů ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ƌĂŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
standards, you know, commissioning it in a more efficient and cost effective way and 
delivering that through district partners ? ?ŽƵŶƚǇcouncil manager).   
This desire to work together came both from public health teams and from district councils.  District 
council respondents saw the potential to be more involved in health improvement for their 
population, and at the same time recognised that their own role, in relation to health, had changed 
over time.  They felt their role was no longer about allocating housing and hoping that complex 
needs would be met: 
 
" ?there was that gap. So it's fine for us to do all the housing and environmental health, but 
actually, if someone's not getting the maybe emotional and mental health and wellbeing 
that they require, we're not actually improving their quality of life to any great degree" 
(District council officer). 
District councils were also seen as being closer to people and better placed to tackle things that are 
 ‘ǀĞƌǇůŽĐĂů ? W particularly where, in a big county, the county council is often described as being too 
big and too remote: 
 “ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞďĞƐƚƉůĂĐĞĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶŝŶŽƵƌƉĂƚĐŚƚŚĂŶŵĂǇďĞƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇ
ƐŝƚƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ĂŶ ŽĨĨŝĐĞ Ăƚ ĐŽƵŶƚǇ ŚĂůů ǁŚŽ ?Ɛ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐĞĞĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ  ?  ?District council senior 
manager).  
 ?ƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚtheir [distriĐƚĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ? ?concern is more to do with their local population so 
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŬĞĞŶƚŽƉƵƚŝŶƚŽƉůĂĐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌůŽĐĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƐ ?
(Public health consultant). 
We found an example in one case study site where a CCG had provided some money for a district 
council to fund voluntary groups undertaking small projects linked to health and wellbeing (e.g.  a 
befriending project) that were carefully targeted and had a high level of engagement from local 
people.  It was argued that locality is important because it is built on the relationships that the 
district council had with individual GPs that predated the formation of the CCG. These relationships 
helped secure the funding.  One county councillor (and chair of the HWB) commented that districts 
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 “bring a lot to the party ?ǁŚĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ ?dŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƚƚŚĞ
local level comes through the work of local boards and this can be balanced with the broader county 
aims. This councilor felt that public health issues such as obesity are discussed more frequently and 
more meaningfully at the local level. 
District councils also provided an alternative decision-making route for bringing about change 
where, for example, a topic or policy area does not gain traction within the county council cabinet 
(e.g. for ideological, political or personal interest reasons):   
 “^ŽŝĨǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂƉŽůŝĐǇĂƌĞĂ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ? ?ŝĨǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂŶĂƌĞĂŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚĂƚǇŽƵknow 
that [the county council] find a challenge... You go and work more with the districts ?(Public 
health consultant). 
 
Respondents also highlighted the need for greater co-ordination given the fragmentation of the 
public health system, with greater potential for variation in activity, and potentially a waste of 
resources, if not managed carefully.  For instance, in site D, it was felt important that district council 
work on health and housing was interweaved with what is going on at county level.  
 
4.5 Working with elected members 
 
A key role of public health teams is their direct work with and for elected members.  These 
relationships are crucial, and point to a major role change for public health professionals since the 
reforms.  Within the NHS, a senior public health professional may have been independently making 
decisions which were subsequently ratified by a chief executive or finance manager.  Within a local 
authority, though, a senior public health professional is chiefly an advisor to the decision makers  W 
the elected members.  Their role was described as assisting elected members to make decisions, by 
providing them with information, advice and suggestions.  In addition to helping elected members to 
make the decisions, they are also responsible for operationalising those decisions/policies/strategies 
once made. 
 
Elected members, in turn, have also experienced a change in role, and now have an important 
potential to champion public health issues.  They also have an important role in holding the local 
public health system to account - directly through their scrutiny ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?Ɛ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ
officers, and more broadly through health scrutiny committees and the HWB.   
 
Importantly, their position within the local public health system was seen in policy as best placed to 
deal with local issues and afford greater democratic accountability (DH 2010). Interviewees in the 
case studies were generally positive about having greater democratic accountability, suggesting this 
has led to a more corporate approach looking across the system/council/communities.  
 “TŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ Ă ŐƌĞĂt rigour then working within the council, because of that democratic 
accountability, which obviously in terms of the Health and Social Care Act, was one of the 
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ĚŚĂǀĞƚŽŚŽƉĞ, that the coalition government were trying to introduce into 




 “ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌƐƚĞŶĚƚŽďĞĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŐŝǀĞĂĐůĞĂƌĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶ
terms of this is an issue or this is very important, this is something that, you know, the 
community would feel very strongly about.  Whereas a public health professional is coming 
ĂƚŝƚĨƌŽŵĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŶŐůĞ ?(Councillor). 
 
While public health staff and councillors talked about the public and public accountability it was in 
different ways. Councillors view the public from a particular perspective that is informed by 
experience and contact  W often at a very local, ward level. Public health staff did see this as positive 
but also referred to it as a problem in relation to what they saw as priorities, based on more formal 
needs assessment and evidence. For example one DPH referred to a local situation regarding 
alcohol: 
 “ ?I remember the conversation we had with members and we were talking about alcohol 
ĂŶĚǁĞƐĂŝĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ? “tĞůůĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĞďĞƐƚƚŚŝŶŐǇŽƵĐĂŶĚŽŝƐƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞŵŝŶŝŵƵŵƉƌŝĐŝŶŐ ? ?
because that would change the environment hugely.  Really good evidence for it.  Price 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐƐƵƉƉůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĚĞŵĂŶĚ ? “tĞůůŽǀĞƌŽƵƌĚĞĂĚďŽĚǇ ? ?dŚĞǇƚŽŽŬŝƚůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?/ƚ
ǁĂƐƐŽƌƚŽĨůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?^Ž/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞďŝŐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂƌĞǁŚĞƌĞǁĞ ?ƌĞĂĚǀŽcating something at 
a population level that is just not palatable from a political... ? 
Elected members were felt to bring different types of knowledge - more granular knowledge, arising 
from their knowledge of their constituents - which could play a part in making those services more 
relevant to their communities, and different ways of seeing things, which could provide a bit of a 
 ‘ƐĞŶƐĞ-ĐŚĞĐŬĞƌ ? ?  KŶĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ĞůĞĐƚĞĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ĐĂŶ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă  “ůŝŬĞůǇ
ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĐŚĞĐŬ ? for experts.  In describing the way she works with her public health 
professionals, an elected member explained: 
 “^Ž ŝƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ƐŽ ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ Ă ƐŽƌƚ ŽĨ ? ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŶƵĂŶĐĞ ? ŝĨ ǇŽƵ ůŝŬĞ ? zŽƵ ŬŶŽǁ ?  ?ƐĞŶŝŽƌ
members of the public health team] clearly are the experts and the professionals, but my role 
ŝƐŵŽƌĞƚŽůŽŽŬĂƚŚŽǁǁĞĐĂŶ ? ? ?ŚŽǁǁĞĐĂŶŵĂŬĞƚŚŽƐĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŵŽƌĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?(Councillor). 
 
Elected members were felt to have a leadership role, in the sense that they could provide public 
leadership that can help  ‘ďƌŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚ
social care system, but also by liaising with and influencing others, potentially driving change and 
ŚĞůƉŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶ ? ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ǁŝĚĞƌ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?  KŶĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůth consultant 
explained that if you have a positive relationship with councillors, there is greater potential for 
change: 
 “If they can locally support the planning side of things, if we raise their awareness around 
what is the role of planning in managing obesity and the role of licensing in management of 
obesity - I ?ŵƐƵƌĞƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁŽĨŝƚ ?ďƵƚŝƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŶĂƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚŵĂŶŶĞƌ
for them, and getting their support - then I think, you know, they are the influencers and 
drivers at a local ůĞǀĞůǁŚĞƌĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŚĂǀĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ?(Public health consultant).  
 
ŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŽ ďƌŝŶŐ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ďǇ ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐ Ă ǁŝĚĞƌ  ‘ƌĞĂĐŚ ? ?
outside the council (through their external connections), across the council (through committees, 
etc.), and down to a more local ward level and their constituents.  Two case study DsPH described 
their elected members as  “ƌĞĂůĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ? for public health.  Meanwhile, one elected member saw 
himself as an advocate for others  W he talked about being there  “ƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? 
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Elected members were also clearly identified in the sites as the decision makers within councils, and 
have power in ratifying papers before going to the cabinet.  Officers recognised that the cabinet 
member had to agree and approve papers before anything else happened and therefore there was a 
ŶĞĞĚƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞŵ ‘ŽŶƐŝĚĞ ? P 
 ? ?ƐŽ/ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐĂďŝŶĞƚŵĞŵďĞƌ ?dŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚŽǇŽƵ
have to get on side to get anything to happen, really, in effect ? (Deputy director of public 
health) 
 
It was also clear that the personal views, ideologies and interests of elected members (particularly 
cabinet members) played a part in determining what got prioritised (e.g. physical activity, smoking), 
and the types of public health decisions made.  This could be a source of possible tension for public 
ŚĞĂůƚŚŝĨƚŚĞŝƌƌĞŵŝƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐĂďŝŶĞƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĚŽŶŽƚĂůŝŐŶ ?Alongside this, councillors also 
suggested that national policy and the political agenda influenced what they decided to respond to 
and prioritise.   One elected member saw his role as being to implement government legislation, e.g. 
in regards to health and social care integration.  It was recognised that they hold multiple 
responsibilities which sometimes conflict. For instance, their public health role might clash with their 
role to promote business (e.g. in terms of introducing legislation to limit fast food outlets), or to 
maximise income (e.g. in terms of investing pensions into tobacco companies). 
Whilst public health professional interviewees recognised that elected members can sometimes be a 
distraction (for instance, by coming up with lots of questions that they want answering), they were 
also very positive about their relationships with them, and seemed to see the value they 
(potentially) add. 
 
4.6 Statutory commissioning responsibilities 
 
Another key role relates to the statutory responsibilities with regards to commissioning services, as 
well as delivering the core advice service to CCGs.  Public health professionals (and others) talked 
about their roles in commissioning new programmes, managing contracts, and managing the 
performance of providers.  We found some evidence of there being a greater onus on the DPH to 
performance-manage those contracts better than before, and sometimes a blurring of whose role it 
is to step in when there is poor performance: 
 
 “ǁĞŚĂǀĞĂƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĂŶĚĂZ' ?ƌĞĚ ?ĂŵďĞƌ ?ŐƌĞĞŶƚƌĂĨĨŝĐůŝŐŚƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƌĂƚĞĚƌĞƉŽƌƚ
that flash sort of red for heĂůƚŚĐŚĞĐŬƐĂŶĚ ?ǇĞĂŚ ?ƚŚĞĐĂďŝŶĞƚŵĞŵďĞƌĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĨůĂƐŚŝŶŐ
ƌĞĚ ŽŶ ŚŝƐ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ĂŶĚ ŚĞ ŚĂĚŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ? ? ? ǁĞůů ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŚĞ ĂƐ
opposed to the commissioning managers in the public health team ... you know, how he should 
tackůĞƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚƌƵƐƚ ?(Strategic director). 
 
There are also suggestions that this role is complicated, and is not always understood by others: 
 
 “ ?ŝƚŚĂƐƚŚƌŽǁŶƵƉƐŽŵĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌƐƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇĂůůƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
always kind of understanding the sort of nuance about the difference between delivery and 
something like this which is largely a commissioned activity or delivery of, you know, fixing the 
potholes in the road  W something much more tangible albeit actually, you know, contracted out a 
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ůŽƚ ?  ^Ž ? ǇĞƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ?ůů ƚĂůŬ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌ ĂƐ ŝĨ ? ǇŽƵ ŬŶŽǁ ? ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ
consultants themselves are out there, you know, weighing kids and delivering the services they 
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?(Director of public health). 
 
In one interview, a long-time local authority commissioner who had become part of the public health 
team following the reforms explained that there were cultural differences to how commissioning is 
approached in local authorities and the NHS: 
 “We [local authority employees] were faced with a lot of ignorance about commissioning and a 
lot of ignorance about local authority style commissioning and business processes amongst our 
[public health] colleagues and we were sort of faced...  I was shocked actually by the lack of 
understanding of what we had been doing or what we did ?(Public health commissioner). 
 
Indeed, this interviewee questioned the role of public health professionals in commissioning: 
 
 “/ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ... / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞǇ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŝƚ ?  / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĞǇ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐƐŽ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚǇǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞĂƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚƉĞƌƐŽŶ W a 
qualified public health person  W to actually commission public health services ?(Public health 
commissioner).   
 
In at least one of our case study sites, new commissioning staff were recruited into the public health 
team to strengthen their capacity in this area. Respondents in our case studies often referred to 
capacity problems and the need for support: 
 
 ‘ ? ? ? ?just got by really and dŽŶĞƐƚƵĨĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬŶŽǁǁĞ ?ƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐ
ƚŽ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐďĞĞŶƐŽŵĞ ?ƐŽƌƚŽĨ ?ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂůƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƉƵƚŝŶƉůĂĐĞƐŽŵĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƐƚƵĨĨ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞĂŵ ?ƐŽǁĞ ?ƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƵƉƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĂƚďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?
which will take the weight off us a little bit as front line, sort of, commissioning 
managers ?(Public health consultant) 
 
There is a sense from our case studies that there is a more rapid/frequent commissioning cycle in 
local authorities  W contracts tend to be shorter than those traditionally commissioned in the NHS  W 
with more frequent and critical reviews.   Almost all DsPH (94%) responding to the survey reported 
having made changes to services commissioned under the ring-fenced budget since the reforms 
(Figure 10) with almost all (94%) having started the process of re-tendering health improvement 
services and most had re-designed existing services with changes in providers.  
 
Changes to commissioning were more common in authorities where the DsPH felt they were 
 ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƋƵŝƚĞŽĨƚĞŶ ?ĂďůĞƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ- 92% of those who always 
felt able, and 98% of those that quite often felt able to influence priorities had made changes, 
compared to 81% making changes in authorities where DsPH said they not often or never had 
influence.  The directors with influence were twice as likely to have set up new services (77% 




Figure 10: Changes made to commissioning services under the ring-fenced public health budget 
  
Changes to commissioning were more common in authorities where the DsPH felt they were 
 ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƋƵŝƚĞŽĨƚĞŶ ?ĂďůĞƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ- 92% of those who always 
felt able, and 98% of those that quite often felt able to influence priorities had made changes, 
compared to 81% making changes in authorities where DsPH said they not often or never had 
influence.  The directors with influence were twice as likely to have set up new services (77% 
compared to 38%) or have changed the provider of an existing service (76% compared to 38%). 
 
4.7 Relationships with PHE 
Relationships with other organisations were not specifically explored in this phase of the research. 
However, our survey data suggested that there were positive relationships between DsPH and their 
local PHE centre with 72% of DsPH saying they had received a good or excellent level of support.  
However, substantially fewer DsPH reported that they had good or excellent support from the PHE 
regional team (23%), and only 13% felt well supported by the PHE national team.  There was some 
criticism of the system rather than the staff as reflected in the following open comments from the 
DsPH survey: 
 ‘This is not a criticism of the good colleagues who work there but more one of the system 
design whereby guidance is produced nationally by PHE and NICE and action taken locally by 
>Ɛ ? ? 
 ‘WĞƌƐŽŶĂůůǇI think PHE involvement in health improvement weakens the ability of LA PH 
teams to be sĞĞŶĂƐůŽĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ? 
Conversely, elected members rated the support from PHE overall quite highly in the survey, with 
54% getting good or excellent support overall from PHE.  They were not particular familiar with the 
local PHE centre and the following is a typical comment by an elected member: 




























Since the April 2013 reforms, have you made any changes to services 
commissioned under the ring-fenced Public Health budget? (DPH survey) 
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4.8 Relationships and functions within the local public health system  ? key points 
 
Our findings suggest that there have been changes in the way that DsPH and the public health team 
work within the local public health system. These changes have brought complexities and new 
challenges, such as working more closely with district councils and maintaining engagement with 
CCGs. The role of district councils appears to be important and in our two county council sites both 
district and county councils saw their collaboration as a key part of delivering public health in local 
communities.  How the relationship develops, however, is dependent on a wide range of factors 
with day to day working developing even where more strategic engagement is lacking. While the 
vertical link with districts is seen as important, the vertical links to PHE are viewed less favourably 
beyond local links with PHE centres.  
 
One policy intention was that DsPH would be advisors and leaders in the public health system. Our 
data provides good evidence that public health teams and elected councillors are working together 
and that, generally, councillors have welcomed the involvement in public health. However, this can 
lead to tensions where priorities between councillors and public health professionals differ.  
Councillors bring local knowledge and expertise to public health. We did not find evidence of this 
tension creating substantial problems in our case study sites, but respondents recognised that this 
was a factor to be constantly borne in mind. 
 
While HWBs are seen as having an important strategic role, there were mixed views about their 
effectiveness. Councillors were more positive about their role than DsPH, and concerns were 
expressed that public health was not a strategic priority given the wider role of the Board. Generally 
the feeling was that their role is still developing.  
 
One significant change has been in the commissioning role of public health. Commissioning in local 
authorities is substantially different to the process that existed in PCTs. This has been both a 









5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this first phase of data collection, including both case studies and the national survey, we have 
found that despite the complexities of embedding public health within local authorities, and 
continuing changes and pressures arising from both the development of the public health function 
and resource challenges faced by local authorities, there was a sense of optimism surrounding the 
public health role of local authorities.  
 
While we focused attention on the models of organisation for public health within local authorities, 
our findings suggest that the inter-organisational arrangements and relationships between local 
authorities are important.  Local context is also important on so many different levels: structural 
contexƚ ? ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?  ‘ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ?  ?ƚŽpublic health ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? The 
increased linkage between public health staff and local councillors is generally seen as positive by 
both public health staff and councillors.  
 
This is an on-going issue, and reflects findings from other studies (Association of Directors of Public 
Health 2014, Mansfield 2013, Royal Society for Public Health 2014, Willmott et al 2015). There 
appears to be ongoing organisational change within local authorities as they respond to constrained 
economic circumstances within local authorities which continue to face resource reductions. Our 
findings reflect earlier studies that show that while organisational reforms have created wider 
opportunities for public health to have an influence, these come with challenges such as increasing 
pressure on decisions and potential loss of control over how and where the public health ring-fenced 
budget is spent (Iacobucci 2014, Willmott 2015). 
 
Our findings, like other research, highlight the fragmentation of the new system, and the continued 
state of change as structures and processes find their feet, and as roles and relationships are 
developed (see for example Mansfield 2013, Willmott et al 2015).  This is occurring in the context of 
wider change, as local authorities (and others) continue to adapt to deal with financial pressures.  In 
addition to fragmentation, our case study findings pointed to a sub-optimal system design (with 
sometimes negative feedback and unintended consequences), and current prematurity of 
organisations.  There were some tensions related to the resulting lack of role clarity which have, in 
some cases, influenced relationship building amongst system actors.  Governance of such an 
emerging, fragmented system is a huge challenge.   The data considered for this report related 
mainly to local level governance.  OƵƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚĞĂŵĂůƐŽĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚĚĂƚĂŽŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ‘ƵƉǁĂƌĚƐ ?
with PHE and NHS England, which will be considered in our next report. 
 
At the local level, there appears to be stronger managerial accountability and scrutiny, led by elected 
members (influenced by their politics, ideology and granular knowledge). This is shining a new light 
on public health activity, and is bringing an important window of opportunity for change  W we saw 
evidence of historical commissioning decisions being challenged, new questions being posed, new 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ŵĂĚĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ think differently.  This might be 
simultaneously liberating and challenging for public health professionals.  In addition, whilst scrutiny 
from elected members was accepted and even welcomed, managerial accountability to directors of 
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other services appeared less easy to accept  W perhaps because of the high status afforded to DsPH 
within local NHS organisations. 
 
Our case study findings highlight the enormous impact that the change in organisational culture has 
had. This was not necessarily a negative view but that councils work differently with more 
accountability and a need to work with others. Feelings about this varied amongst interviewees 
within the same local authority.  One person can find the new bureaucracy more accountable and 
transparent leading to more evidence-based commissioning of services and a clearer sense of 
tracking commissioning outcomes, while others find the system overly bureaucratic, slow, set in a 
certain groove and unable to accommodate innovative commissioning.   
 
The role of the DPH in terms of system leadership has changed and become more dispersed. Instead, 
the new system gives rise to the potentially huge role a leader/chief executive can play in terms of 
determining the importance and focus of public health goals and activities.  The power and potential 
influence of the DPH might depend very much on his/her relationship with key elected members, 
and will be channelled through a host of decisions regarding structural and managerial 
arrangements.  Issues related to internal organisation and structure  W including the position of the 
public health team within the organisational structure, the line-management of the DPH, and the 
inter-departmental fora on which the DPH has a voice  W seem to be important in determining power, 
influence and relationships. ZĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ďĞŝŶŐ Ă ŐŝǀĞŶ ? ƚŚĞ W, ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ƌŽůĞ ŵŝŐht emerge, 
given the right ingredients and nurturing.  Willmott et al (2015:4) in their study of DsPH in the south 
ǁĞƐƚ ĂůƐŽ ĨŽƵŶĚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƐW, ĂƌĞ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ   “ ?DsPH are responding with political  
sophistication; negotiating autonomy and influence; navigating pre-conceptions about public health; 
ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞƚŽĨŽƐƚĞƌůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇǁŚŝůĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? ?. 
 
In such a fragmented system, the HWB is crucial in ensuring local governance and stewardship.  
However, whilst the HWB was seen ĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂƌŽůĞŝŶ ‘ŚŽůĚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ?ŝƚ
did not have any inherent power to fulfil this role, and it was unclear how this might work.  Data 
suggested that HWBs have dual roles of building better relationships whilst at the same time 
applying pressure and scrutiny. These roles may be uneasy bedfellows.  Also, it was seen that the 
remit of the HWB is extremely broad, and certainly in the period of time in which we were collecting 
data, the dominant priorities were integrated care and the Better Care Fund (LGA 2014).  That 
councillors were more optimistic about the HWB role than DsPH may reflect the different 
institutional positions they hold, with DsPH primarily looking to HWBs for a stronger role in public 
health, while councillors are more engaged in their broader overall health system role. Our data 
suggest that HWBs have not developed an executive decision making role but remain information 
exchangers and focused on a co-ordination role  W supporting the findings of other research 
(Humphries and Galea 2013). 
 
One aspect of sub-optimal system design can be seen in two-tier council areas.  Insufficient attention 
was paid to the important public health functions in district councils beyond those resulting from the 
1984 Act (Secretary of State 1984)  W including for example, leisure, housing, licensing, and planning 
(District Councils Network 2014).  It was clear from our data that working out this relationship 
(between district councils and county-based public health teams) is crucial and appears to be 
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developing differently in different areas. In some areas, we have seen district councils seizing the 
initiative and taking a key and active part in public health leadership.  Elected members here, like 
their counterparts in the upper-tier authority, are challenging public health professionals, and 
seeking to influence them, as well as wanting to draw on their professional skills.   Public health 
professionals, in their turn, are recognising the potential advantages to be had in engaging with this 
tier  W despite the investment costs.  In our two county sites, we saw how district-level HWBs were, in 
some cases, much more of a focus for public health discussion and action than the upper-tier 
boards.   
 
Prior to the reforms, the corporate identity of public health professionals was shaped by being part 
of the NHS.  In the new system, public health staff have to develop a corporate identity as part of a 
particular local council.  Organisationally, these are very different to local NHS organisations  W they 
are democratically run, autonomous, locally-focused organisations.  With this identity comes a new 
form of corporate accountability and political awareness, which some public health professionals 
ŚĂǀĞ ĨŽƵŶĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐŝƚĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚ  ‘ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǀŽŝĐĞ ? ? ƚ
the same time as developing this corporate identity within the local council, public health 
professionals are supposed to not only challenge the council and hold it to account for its progress 
(or otherwise) on health improvement and health inequalities, but they are also expected to work 
closely with a range of other organisations across the system. 
 
The changes in roles across the system do seem to lean towards consequent changes in approaches 
to public health and activities for health improvement.  We have seen windows of opportunity 
opening.  However, it is not yet clear how long those windows will be open for  W particularly given 
the current requirement to cut budgets  W and it is not yet clear what public health teams, working 
with others across the system, will make of those opportunities.  It is also possible that the new 
duties and responsibilities for public health will shape councils in different ways  W for example, if 
directorates/departments and ways of working become ever more cross cutting and integrated 
(rather than based on specific individual services), elected members will also have to start rethinking 
their portfolios and ways in which they have traditionally worked.   In addition, elected members will 
have to reconcile their roles in improving health with their roles in promoting economic 
development, or even in supporting other local political priorities.   
In our next round of fieldwork, we will shift the focus towards exploring some of the emerging 
themes in the context of obesity where we are examining three aspects of work: 
 
1. Relationships between local authority public health and the delivery of clinical obesity 
services (i.e. links with CCGs and NHSE). 
2. Obesity prevention work in schools with a focus primarily on inter- and intra-local 
government relationships and relationships between public health departments and schools 
and community health services (e.g. school nurses). 
3. Examining the relationships between public health departments and planning functions in 





In addition we are conducting a limited number of interviews at the regional and national level to 
examine key relationships between local authorities and PHE (national/regional) and NHSE (area 
teams, specialised commissioning).  The findings from this fieldwork will be incorporated into our 
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